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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW1
football squad. Therefore, playing football was an incident of the
employment, and the injury arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
Whether the school is receiving reasonable value for the remu-
neration it gives constitutes another criterion the court might use
in deciding whether there is an employer-employee relationship.
Thus, if it appears that the jobs assigned were shams (the value
of the scholarship being disproportionate to the services rendered),
it could be inferred that participation in the sport is the real pur-
pose of the arrangement and is an incident of the employment.
To summarize, the courts in two situations have allowed re-
covery under workmen's compensation acts to the student-recipient
of an athletic scholarship. First, where a contract of employment
to play a sport can be established; and second, where there is
employment to perform certain tasks, which employment is depend-
ent upon the student playing the sport.
In Van Horn an employer-employee relationship was found to
have arisen of which, very likely, the coach, student, and school
were all unaware. This holding might result in athletic scholarships
becoming an expensive proposition for colleges, considering the
number of permanent injuries and deaths which result from con-
tact sports. The Industrial Accident Commission remarked in its
denial of the application for death benefits that "to hold that de-
cedent was an employee would impose a heavy burden on institu-
tions of learning and would discourage the granting of scholar-
ships."'" This may be true and could cause a reduction in scholar-
ships, but it is the natural result of calling a spade a spade where
one finds a hole in the ground.
Joe N. Turner
FELONY-MURDER - SURVIVING CO-FELONS ARE PUN-
ISHABLE FOR FIRST DEGREE VURDER UNDER CALI-
FORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 189 FOR THE KILL-
ING OF A CONFEDERATE BY THE OWNER OF THE
STORE WHICH THEY WERE ROBBING. People v. Hand,
(San Diego July 22, 1963).
In the process of executing a planned robbery of a store, one of
four robbers was killed by the owner. The store had been previ-
ously robbed and the owner was waiting for such a recurrence.
17 33 Cal. Rtpr. at 174.
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Held, on demurrer to the indictment,1 the surviving felons were
punishable for first degree murder because the legislature intended
this fact situation to be within the purview of section 189 and be-
cause of a strong public policy as a deterrent to violent felonies.
People v. Hand, Crim. No. 5471, Super. Ct., San Diego (July 22,
1963).
The California statute,2 like that of several other states,3 in-
cludes in its definition of first degree murder: "All murder... com-
mitted in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, rob-
bery, burglary, mayhem.., is murder of the first degree." Murder
is defined as: "... . the unlawful killing of a human being, with mal-
ice aforethought."4 Malice is defined as either express or implied:
"... It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied,
when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circum-
stances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart."'
In holding the surviving felons punishable for first degree murder,
the court in the Hand case construed murder in section 189 to mean
any killing which was a foreseeable consequence of the defendants'
act and which occurred during the commission of one of the
enumerated felonies. To support this proposition reliance is placed
upon an editorial note following section 189 of the 1872 edition
of the annotated Penal Code' which cites People v. Sanchez7 as
standing for this interpretation. The court goes on to state that appli-
cation of Penal Code section 189 is justified as a deterrent to violent
felonies, conceding, however, that the felon probably is not aware
that he might be charged with murder if his confederate is killed
while committing the felony. The decision concludes that the legis-
lature intended the statute to apply in such cases and that to limit
application would be an improper exercise of the court's power.
The problem in applying the felony-murder doctrine is that mal-
ice must be imputed to the person charged so that the killing will
I After a holding that the felons could be prosecuted under § 189, defendants
pleaded guilty; one to second degree murder, one to robbery, and the other
to conspiracy to commit robbery.
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 189. Derivation: STATS. 1850, ch. 99, p. 231, § 21;
amend. STATS. 1856, ch. 139, p. 219, § 2. Amendments in 1872 added mayhem
and in 1949 any acts punishable under Pen. Code § 288.
3 This formula, variously worded, is found in the statutes of Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Bhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 187.
5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 188.
6 HAY-OND & BimcH ED. 82 (1872).
7 24 Cal. 17,29 (1864).
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amount to murder as required by the statute.' Where the felon's
act is the direct cause of the killing, imputation of malice has caused
little difficulty.' But where the lethal blow is not produced in this
manner, the rationalization is more acute and the reported decisions
reach confusing and divergent results.Y
Certain factual situations which have confronted courts may be
classified thusly:
Group A
This grouping has three variations:
1. The felon does the actual killing."
2. Co-felon is held for an accidental killing by his co-conspira-
tor committed within the scope of the conspiracy."2
3. The felon's act is a direct cause of the death, e.g., where
he used the victim as a shield.'"
Group B
A non-participant kills another non-participant at the scene of
a felony. In the usual case a person in a defensive action acci-
dentally kills a bystander.'4
s People v. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 172, 78 Pac. 549, 550 (1904). " and the
malice of the abandoned and malignant heart is shown from the very na-
ture of the crime you are attempting to commit."
9 A survey of the reported California decisions reveals that in all but two
cases the felon was the direct cause of the death.
10 Those applying:
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 2d 205 (1955); Common-
wealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595 (1949); Letner v. State, 156
Tenn. 68, 299 S.W. 1049 (1927); Keton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 57
S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900);
Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W. 2d 100 (1934); Commonwealth v.
Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357
Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947); People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.
2d 201 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952).
Those rejecting:
People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928); Commonwealth v. Moore,
121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E.
338, 8 Am. St. Rep. 423 (1888); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 541
(1863); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924); People v.
Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391
Pa. 486, 137 A. 2d 472 (1958); People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.
2d 766 (1963); People v. La Barbera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.Supp. 257(1936); Note: This is not a complete survey of all the fact situations arising
in Groups B, C & D, but it is a fair indi6ation that the reported decisions
are equally divided.
11 The most frequent situation is where the felon kills during the commission of
a robbery, 25 CAL. JuR 2 D Homicide § 77.
12 People v. Bauman, 39 Cal. App. 2d 587, 103 P. 2d 1020 (1940); People v.
Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P. 2d 364 (1939).
1s For comprehensive survey of the Shield cases see: Letner v. State, 156 Tenn.
68, 299 S.W. 1049, 1050-1051 (1927).24 Non-participant used in this sense means that neither actual killer or victim
is one of the felons. People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr.
414 (1959); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595 (1949).
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Group C
A non-participant kills one of the co-felons within the res
gestae of a felony as in the Hand case. 5
Group D
One of the co-felons accidentally kills himself while commit-
ting the felony. 6
The ultimate problem, in considering cases arising in the above
groupings, is in determining what limits the legislature intended
when they specified that the killing must amount to murder.
It is a fundamental principle that a code represents the law as it
exists or should be at the time of adoption." An 1857 California
case held that the statute defining murder ". .. is but an enuncia-
tion of the common law definition of the crime."' 8 The question
now becomes: what was the felony-murder rule under the common
law at the time the California Penal Code was adopted in 1850?
Probably the first formal statement of the felony-murder doctrine
appears in Lord Dacre's case'9 in 1535. Since that time numerous
cases and authorities have stated the common law rule as: Any kill-
ing by one in the commission of a felony is guilty of murder.2"
Although the early common law cases use broad language-any
killing, it is interesting to note that these cases all involved facts
characterized within some subdivision in Group A.2 A widely ac-
cepted and quite plausible explanation for this expansive language
is that at early common law all felonies were punishable by death.
Thus, it was of little concern whether the felon was executed for
the original felony or for the accidental killing resulting therefrom 2
Keeping in mind that under common law any killing by one en-
gaged in the commission of a felony is chargeable with murder,
then the logical inference is that the legislature, when it said all
murder, substituted a word for the rule.
25 Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A. 2d 472 (1958); People v.
Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W. 2d 766 (1963).
16 People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928); People v. La Barbera,
159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.Supp. 257 (1936); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381
Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464 (1955).
1? BLACK, LAw DicmoNRY 323 (4th ed. 1951), "A code implies a compilation
of existing laws, systematically arranged ... and generally to clarify and make
complete... Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 106 So. 231, 235 (1925)."
's People v. Moore, 8 Cal. 90, 92 (1857).
'9 72Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1535).
20 3 CoKE, INsTrruTms 66 (1797); 1 HALE, PLEAS OF = CaOwN 424-503
(1st Am. ed. 1847); BLAcKSTONE, COM21MNmeABES § 192-93, 200-01; 3
STE'nENs, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 57, 75 (1883).
21 A search of the early common law cases indicates the felony-murder rule was
only applied to facts arising in Group A.
22 HrrcHLERa, The Killer and his Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53 DIcK L.
R .3 (1948).
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It is generally conceded that the common law rule was intended
to apply to Group A facts. Two early cases had refused to apply the
rule to Group B facts.23 In Group A there is little problem imputing
malice. The earlier line of California decisions in Group A held
that the statute created a conclusive presumption of premedita-
tion;24 hence, the malice requirement was satisfied. This rationale
survived until 1946 when it was recognized that the conclusive
presumption approach was confusing. An even more spurious doc-
trine was substituted, viz., such a killing was murder by force of
the statute.25 Now the court is saying that malice is implicit from
the very nature of the initial felony, not as a result of the accidental
killing by the felon. This was undoubtedly the common law rule,
but with one caveat: malice was imputed only to brand the accidental
killing as murder when the felon actually caused the death, Group
A. There is some authority for the position that a killing by one en-
gaged in the commission of a felony is murder, not by imputation
of malice, but rather as a matter of the Common Law."0
A survey of California appellate decisions reveals only two cases
which have decided cases involving facts not in Group A: People
v. Ferlin (1928)2" Group D, and People v. Harrison (1959)8
Group B. In Ferlin the California Supreme Court declined to hold
the surviving felon liable for the death of a confederate who had
accidentally killed himself. The case involved a disgruntled lessor
who hired an arsonist to burn down a building in order to oust his
lessee. In carrying out his task, the arsonist bungled, setting fire to
himself as well as the building, thus causing his death. Refusing
to hold the lessor liable for first degree murder under Penal Code
section 189, the court stated that the death was not in pursuance of
a common design of the conspiracy, and "It would not be seriously
contended that one accidentally killing himself while engaged in
the commission of a felony was guilty of murder. If the defendant
herein is guilty of murder because of the accidental killing of his co-
conspirator then it must follow that Skala (the deceased) was also
guilty of murder, and, if he had recovered from his burns, that he
would have been guilty of an attempt to commit murder."2 The
23 Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 541 (1863); Butler v. People, 125
Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338, 18 Am. St. Rep. 423 (1888).
24 People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 (1864); People v. Anderson, 1 Cal. 2d 687,
37 P. 2d 67 (1934); People v. Petro, 13 Cal. App. 2d 245, 56 P. 2d 984
(1936).
25 People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 169 P. 2d 1 (1946); People v. Lindley,
26 Cal. 2d 780, 161 P. 2d 277 (1945); People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App.
2d 52, 87 P. 2d 364 (1939).
26 PERKINs, CmmA. LAWw, 76 (1957).
27 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230.
28 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959).
29 265 Pac. at 234.
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court was pointing out that if the deceased could not be guilty of
murder, then neither could the surviving co-felon.
The other case, People v. Harrison, decided in the Second District
Court of Appeal, applied the doctrine where the victim of the rob-
bery accidentally killed his employer in a gun battle with the felons,
Group B. This is the first California decision holding that Penal
Code section 189, applies if the killing is a foreseeable consequence,
even though actually committed by a non-participant. In other
words, if the result is foreseeable, malice will be imputed because
the felon has breached his duty of care in committing a felony. To
arrive at this result the court in the Harrison case relies heavily
upon the language of the earlier California cases in Group A and
upon two Pennsylvania decisions, Commonwealth v. Moyer"0 and
Commonwealth v. Almeida3' which hold the surviving felon for
first degree murder under an identical statute32 and similar facts.
The inherent weakness of the Harrison decision rests upon several
grounds.
1. The court neglected to accurately determine the rule at com-
mon law as it existed immediately prior to the adoption of the code.3
2. In citing early California decisions, the court did not concede
that the decisions might be limited by their precise facts.84
3. The only California Supreme Court decision involving Group
D facts had rejected application of the doctrine. 5
4. The two Pennsylvania cases, Moyer and Almeida, which ap-
plied the doctrine under an identical statute and similar facts were
questionable authority in Pennsylvania when cited in Harrison. The
Harrison opinion makes no reference to Commonwealth v. Red-
line," decided after Almeida but a year before Harrison. Redline
refused to impute malice to a surviving co-felon who was charged
with murder as a result of the killing of his confederate by a police
officer. The decision does not expressly overrule Moyer and Almeida
but the court states in conclusion: "'The limitation which we thus
30 357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947).
31 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595 (1949).
32 18 PA. STATS. ANN. § 4701 (1963).
33 The court discusses to some extent the historical development of the rule, but
cites text writers who were not considering a specific statute such as Pazr.
CODE § 189; see 176 Cal. App. 2d at 333-5.
84 The California cases cited, with the exception of People v. Ferlin, are charac-
terized in Group A. This is not mentioned.
85 The Ferlin decision is distinguished by reference to People v. Cabaltero, Group
A, which distinguishes Ferlin on the theory that ... an examination of the
factual situation therein shows it is entirely different from the one here pre-
sented.. ." 176 Cal. App. 2d at 342.
83 391 Pa. 486, 137 A. 2d 472 (1958).
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place on the decision in the Almeida case renders unnecessary any
present reconsiderations of the extended holding in that case. It will
be time enough for action in such regard if and when a conviction
for murder based on facts similar to those presented by the Almeida
case (both as to the performer of the lethal act and the status of its
victim) should again come before this court.""7 (Emphasis added.)
The court clearly indicates, however, that any extension in Group C
would be judicial legislation3
The court in Hand relies upon the Harrison-Almeida-Moyer
line of thinking to sustain its position. These cases utilize the doc-
trine of proximate cause to justify their conclusion. Hand, like Har-
rison, makes no attempt to distinguish Ferlin, Redline, or People
v. Austin,39 a recent Michigan Supreme Court decision in Group B
which follows Redlive.
Underlying this theory of holding a felon liable for the foresee-
able consequences of his act is the desire to punish the felon for
any death he might have reasonably foreseen when he participated
in a violent felony. Although desire to reach a utilitarian result is
admirable, it should not be accomplished by judicially rewriting the
statute. "A judicial decision which is founded simply on the im-
pulse that 'something should be done' or which looks no further
than to the 'justice' or 'injustice' of a particular case, is not likely
to have lasting influence . . .Our scheme of ordered liberty is
based, like the common law, on enlightened and uniformly applied
legal principle, not on ad hoc notions of what is right or wrong in
a particular case.""0
The Hand decision indicates the willingness of a trial court to
give preference to a ruling of the District Court of Appeal and to
distinguish the only Supreme Court decision which does not sup-
port its position. Even when the trial court instructs that the doc-
trine applies in Groups B, C and D, juries are prone to acquit.4
It is a difficult task to convince a jury that a surviving co-felon is
guilty of first degree murder when his confederate is killed by some-
one else during the commission of the felony.
37 Id. 137 A. 2d at 483.
38 Id. at 474.
39 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W. 2d 766 (1963).
40 Address by John M. Harlan, Associate justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, at the American Bar Center, Chicago, August 13, 1963. Reported in
49 A.B.A.J. 943 (1963).41 People v. Jones, 177 Cal. App. 2d 420, 17 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1961), provides
a good illustration. S and J were charged with murder, burglary, robbery
and consiracy for the killing by a police officer of their accomplice. The
police o cer had been advised of the planned robbery and killed one of the
felons during the attempt. The jury acquitted the defendants of murder and
burglary, but convicted of robbery and conspiracy.
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Because of the inconsistency in its application, the felony-murder
doctrine needs to be legislatively re-examined in California, as it
has been elsewhere.' If, when the legislature says all murder it
means any killing, it should so express itself. "If predominant pres-
ent-day thinking should deem it necessary to the public's safety and
security that felons be made chargeable with murder for all deaths
occurring in and about the perpetration of their felonies-regard-
less of how or by whom such fatalities came-the legislature should
be looked to . ..- In a speech before the California State Bar in
September 1963, California's Chief Justice Phil S. Gibson indicated
his dissatisfaction with recent applications of the doctrine stating
.. . a strong case may be made for at least limiting the scope of
the rule."
It is axiomatic that the court should not rewrite a statute to ac-
complish a particular result. That is the function of the legislature 5
"The only constitutional power competent to define crimes and pre-
scribe punishment therefore is the legislature, and the courts do well
to leave the promulgation .. to the people's chosen legislative rep-
resentatives." 6
Robert C. Baxley
42 The rule has been abolished in England, § I HomcmE AcT, 1957, 59 Eaz
2, c. 11; substantially modified in Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 1958;
limited in New York to a killing ". . . by a person engaged in the commission
... of a felony," N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1044.
48 Jones, C. J., majority opinion, Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A. 2d at 474.
4 San Francisco, September 1963.
45 Duart v. Aton-Cross, 19 Conn. Supp. 188, 110 A. 2d 647,649 (1954).
46 Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A. 2d at 473.
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